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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this paper is to provide the evidence on the "stickiness" of 
intergovernmental transfers. Namely, intergovernmental transfers have fiscal 
(expenditure) effects as they stimulate provision of local government goods and 
services, and this expenditure effect should be larger for the matching grants 
and smaller for lump-sum transfers. It is also expected that this effect would be 
larger than the equivalent increase in local income, prediction labelled as fly-
paper effect when related to lump-sum transfers. Empirical research for 
Slovenian municipalities provides the evidence that the magnitude of expenditure 
effects of various categories of intergovernmental transfers is substantially lower 
compared to international findings, and in some cases the effect is even smaller 
than the effect of per-capita  income. 
Key words: local public finances, intergovernmental transfers, expenditure 
effect 
JEL: H71 
1 Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to provide the evidence on the "stickiness" 
of intergovernmental transfers in specific context of post-socialist country. 
Intergovernmental transfers have fiscal (expenditure) effects as they 
stimulate provision of local government goods and services. One of the 
first systematic discussions on the fiscal effects of intergovernmental 
transfers has been developed by Gramlich & Galper (1973). They have 
classified the intergovernmental transfers into three types: (1) open-end 
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matching grants, where the higher level of government pays some portion 
of the cost of certain expenditures of lower level of government, which 
effectively reduces the price of services delivered by local government; (2) 
closed-end lump-sum transfers, where the higher level of government 
basically transfers a fixed amount of money to a lower level of government 
without imposing any restrictions on the use of money or changing any 
relative prices; and (3) closed-end categorical grants, where the higher 
level of government transfers a limited amount of money to be used for a 
specific programme implemented by lower level of government, which 
actually means that this type of grant is a hybrid of the first two types (price 
of the programme is lowered, yet the size of the grant is limited). The 
authors have pointed out that the expenditure effect should be larger for 
the open-end matching grants and smaller for closed-end lump-sum 
transfers, whereas the expenditure effect of closed-end categorical grants 
should be somewhere in between of those two effects.1 
Besides, Gramlich & Galper (1973) have also pointed out that lump-
sum transfers have larger effect on government spending than equivalent 
increase in private income – they have labelled that phenomenon as the 
»fly-paper theory of incidence«, since »money sticks where it hits«. 2 
Namely, the empirical findings have shown that lump-sum transfers of 
central government tend to have greater stimulatory effect on local 
government spending than the equivalent increase in the income of the 
median voter (see, e.g., Brennan & Pincus, 1996; Strumpf, 1998).3 This 
means that fly-paper effect actually contradicts traditional theory of grants-
in-aid of exhaustive governmental expenditures (see Bradford & Oates, 
1971; Bailey, 1999), which is based on median voter theorem of public 
choice. Namely, this theorem states that intergovernmental transfers and 
voter income should have identical effects on local government 
expenditure (Wyckoff, 1988). Nevertheless, empirical research has shown 
that local authorities tend to spend those transfers rather to pass such 
transfers to local residents in the form of tax cuts. 
                                              
1 In other words, lump-sum grants have only an income effect, whereas matching grants 
have also substitution effect. 
2 It is worth stressing that fly-paper effect prediction refers only for lump-sum transfers (see 
also Acosta, 2010). 
3 The label fly-paper effect was first delivered by Okun (see Hines & Thaler, 1995). 
Primož Pevcin 
Expenditure Effects of Intergovernmental Transfers – 
the Case of Slovenia 
   Uprava, letnik IX, 4/2011 33 
2 The literature on the expenditure effects of 
intergovernmental transfers 
It is worth noting that fly-paper effect has been extensively addressed 
in literature, since the problem of unequal response of local government 
expenditures on equal increase in local community income and lump-sum 
transfers has been observed in many empirical studies on cross-sectional 
variation in intergovernmental transfers, although the majority of studies 
tend to focus on industrialised countries (Acosta, 2010). In fact, the fly-
paper effect was one of the main concerns in the earlier literature on 
intergovernmental transfers. Modelling of the fly-paper effect has been 
based on various assumptions, such as voters facing fiscal illusion and 
absence of political competition, self-interest of politicians and 
imperfections in the political system etc. (Gamkhar & Shah, 2007). 
In general, four possible explanations for the observed fly-paper effect 
phenomenon have been provided in the empirical literature (Inman, 
2008). First possible explanation focuses on the data and states that 
intergovernmental transfers are miss-measured, since matching grants 
tend to be equalised with lump-sum aid.4 Namely, the former has a price 
effect as it lowers the marginal price of public services, whereas the latter 
has only an income effect. 5  Second possible explanation sees the 
phenomenon basically as the consequence of econometric problem. 
Namely, the fly-paper effect should be the consequence of 
misspecifications of the technology and costs of providing services in the 
local level, which should occur due to the failure to correctly validate the 
possibility of citizen exit from high tax jurisdictions. 6  Third possible 
explanation focuses on the possibility of misspecification of citizen fiscal 
choices, as citizens may not understand the complexity of grant 
programmes. Finally, the last possible explanation, maybe most 
promising, sees the phenomenon as a consequence of politics. This 
explanation actually complements voter ignorance hypothesis in a sense 
that voters perceive aid’s budgetary effects, yet they allocate public and 
                                              
4 In other words, fly-paper effect may be observed when matching grants are mistaken for 
lump-sum transfers, as matching grants tend to have larger expenditure effects than lump-
sum transfers. This indicates that caution should be taken when interpreting fly-paper 
effect. More on the possible grant misspecification see Bailey (1999). 
5  Nevertheless, several authors have argued that fly-paper effect still remains, even if 
matching grants and aid programmes are correctly classified (see Wyckoff, 1991). 
6 More on this see also Worthington & Dollery (1999). 
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private money through separate »mental accounts«; public budget is taken 
as the responsibility of government and private budget as individual 
responsibility. Consequently, fly-paper effect exists as a consequence of 
incentives of elected politicians and is thus influenced by political system.7 
Economic theory has provided several theoretical concepts to explain 
the phenomenon of the fly-paper effect. First, the median voter theory 
argues that the fly-paper effect should be the result of mistakes in research 
methods, whereas Leviathan model of budget maximising behaviour 
contemplates that fly-paper is the result of local politicians using their 
monopoly power over budget information to increase their budgets, either 
to deceive voters for gaining support for larger expenditures or to hide the 
intergovernmental grants from voters (see Bae & Feiock, 2004). Finally, 
the last approach is based on the concept of »fiscal illusion«, since the 
citizens ignore that intergovernmental transfers lower the real price for the 
provision of public goods at the local level, which means that those funds 
could be implicitly refunded to them in the form of tax cuts (Sour & Giron, 
2009). In this context, this concept predicts that government actually 
produces the output demanded by the median voter, although this 
demand is based on misperceptions how the public goods are financed 
and what is their own share in bearing the costs of production (Widarjono, 
2006). 
As already mentioned, numerous studies have tested the expenditure 
effects of intergovernmental transfers and possible existence of fly-paper 
effect in local authority financing (see e.g. Hines & Thaler (1995), Becker 
(1996), Turnbull (1998), Bailey & Connolly (1998), Worthington & 
Dollery (1999), Knight (2002), Inman (2008), Sour & Giron (2009), 
Acosta (2010), just to name a few out of vast array of research in this 
field). For instance, Inman (2008) has reported that, according to Google 
Scholar search engine, until 2008 more than 3,500 papers have been 
written dealing with the issue of fly-paper effect. Yet, it needs to be 
acknowledged that some studies were not able to confirm the validity 
                                              
7 More on this see Hines & Thaler (1995). Consequently, this explanation stresses that fly-
paper is not anomaly but rather reality of fiscal policies. In fact, as Rodden (2006) has 
argued in his revision of Hamilton’s paradox, a negative effect of decentralised 
government finance is associated with the moral hazard problem, which is even inflated if 
sub-national governments are funded primarily through revenue-sharing and grants. In this 
case centre dominates the power to tax and takes on heavy obligations on funding of sub-
national governments, which causes that officials of sub-national governments face weak 
incentives for fiscal discipline. 
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of effect. For instance, Becker (1996) has even argued that fly-paper 
effect is actually a statistical artefact, since inappropriate functional form 
of estimation may generate the illusion of fly-paper effect presence. 
Moreover, Bailey (1999) has presented an overview of potential factors 
causing overestimation in the size of the fly-paper effect. Those factors 
include possible misspecification of the type of intergovernmental grant, 
use of an inappropriate function form in regression analysis, and use of 
inappropriate explanatory (control) variables in the regression analysis.8 
3 Empirical evidence on the expenditure effect of 
intergovernmental transfers across Slovenian 
municipalities 
Consequently, the purpose of this study is to examine the magnitude 
of expenditure effects of intergovernmental transfers and to test possible 
existence of fly-paper effect for a cross-section of 210 Slovenian 
municipalities in 2009. 9  The reduced-form regression model for local 
government expenditure is: 
EXPi = ßXi + ui , 
 
where EXPi is total expenditure per capita for municipality i, Xi represents 
explanatory variables that affect municipal expenditure level in the sample 
period, and ui describes unobservable shocks to municipal spending. 
Expenditures of Slovenian municipalities include current and investment 
expenditures and transfers, given loans and capital investments, as well as 
debt repayments. According to the Local Self-Government Act (2007), 
                                              
8 The empirical analysis, presented in the next chapter, focuses only on estimation of 
expenditure effects of intergovernmental transfers received by Slovenian municipalities, in 
order to avoid the problem of grant type misspecification. 
9 It needs to be stressed that cross-sectional data are used in the analysis. There are 
several reasons for using those data: (1) several other existing empirical studies have used 
cross-sectional data (more on this see Amusa, Mabunda & Mabugu, 2008; Acosta, 
2010); (2) there are problems with achieving consistent time series data for Slovenian 
municipalities, given the fact that their number has risen constantly and substantially in last 
17 years, predominantly with devolutions of existing municipalities; (3) given the previous 
observation, substantial changes in the legislation on municipal finances happened in last 
few years (the last modification appeared in 2008 and became valid for 2009 fiscal year), 
contributing to the fact that data comparison between different fiscal years could be 
problematic. Furthermore, it needs to be stressed there is no intermediate level of local 
authorities (i.e. regions), although both professional and political discussions on this issue 
have existed. See, e.g. readings in Setnikar-Cankar & Šević (2008) on administrative, 
economic, organisational and fiscal perspectives of regionalisation in Slovenia. 
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municipalities perform local matters of public interest in order to meet the 
needs of their residents. Specifically, municipalities manage the municipal 
assets and organise municipal administration, develop conditions for 
economic development of the municipality, provide spatial development 
plans and create conditions for housing, manage and regulate local 
public utilities and local public services provision, provide social services 
(in particular pre-school and primary school education, social, cultural 
and recreational activities etc.), organise local road maintenance, fire 
safety etc.10 These so-called own functions of municipalities are planned 
in the municipal budget formulated for the period of a single (fiscal) year. 
Table below summarises expenditures of Slovenian municipalities by 
function. 
Table 1: Consolidated expenditures (functional classification) of Slovenian 
municipalities, 2009 (in million EUR) 
Public administration 429.38 
Defence 3.46 
Public order 43.58 
Public utilities 522.91 
Environment protection 207.21 
Housing and spatial development 182.13 
Health 16.12 
Recreation, culture and activities of NGO’s 244.28 
Education 484.34 
Social security 102.18 
Total 2,235.59 
Source: Ministry of Finance, 2011. 
In contrast, municipalities in Slovenia receive their resources from tax 
revenues, non-tax revenues, capital revenues, donations, transfers and EU 
funds. Specifically, Act on Local Finances ZFO-1A (2008) envisages and 
specifies that municipalities in Slovenia finance their activities from 
following resources: (1) own tax revenues, which include revenues from 
                                              
10 See the act on detailed description of municipal tasks. It needs to be stressed that large 
differences in the size of municipalities exist, and there is no intermediate level of local 
authorities (i.e., regions). In particular, Slovenia is a relatively centralised country, given the 
fact that approximately nine tenths of total government spending is allocated by central 
government (Government Office for Local-Self Government and Regional Policy, 2006). 
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inheritance and gift taxes, property taxes, taxes on profits from lotteries 
and gaming, taxes on real estate business transactions, 54% of personal 
income tax paid by municipal residents11, etc.; (2) other own revenues, 
which include administrative fees and duties, concession duties and 
municipal communal rates, revenues from public utilities, environmental 
duties, revenues derived from the municipal property management, 
donations, transfers from central government budget, etc.; (3) municipal 
duties, which include compensation fees for use of municipal land, etc.; 
and (4) borrowing, although the amount of municipal borrowing is limited 
by the law. 
Table 2: Consolidated revenues of municipalities in Slovenia (excluding 
borrowing and financial investments), 2009 (in million EUR) 
Tax revenues 1,295.31 
Non-tax revenues 256.17 
Capital revenues 97.12 
Donation 3.86 
Transfers 382.37 
EU funds 1.73 
Total 2,036.56 
Source: Ministry of Finance, 2011. 
The Act on Local Finances (1998) introduced a system of appropriate 
expenditure in order to allow municipalities to carry out their constitutional 
and legal responsibilities. According to this system, last amended in 
2007 fiscal year (Act on Local Finances ZFO-1, 2006)12, appropriate 
expenditure is calculated on the basis of a special equation, which 
includes correctional factors for diversity in municipalities for the purpose 
of achieving the equalisations (in comparison to national average), such 
as the spatial size of municipality, number of residents, number of 
residents aged below 15 and above 65 and the length of local roads. 
Local Self-Government Act (2007) stipulates that municipalities must raise 
                                              
11 This source tends to be the most important one in practice (see Ministry of Finance, 
2010). 
12 Basically, the model of calculation of i-th municipality appropriate expenditure has been 
amended in the sense that weights of correctional factors have been changed and the 
average municipal costs per capita needed for financing of their tasks has been introduced 
as a basis for appropriate expenditure calculation. See the law for the exact formula. 
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their own revenue. Financially disadvantaged municipalities, unable to 
fully perform their duties, are eligible to receive additional financial 
assistance from the state in accordance with the principles and criteria 
prescribed by the law. This actually means that municipalities, where own 
resources may not be sufficient to finance provision of the services that 
certain municipality is obliged to deliver, are eligible to receive special 
financial equalisation from central government budget. 13  This actually 
means that spending on municipal constitutional and legal responsibilities 
does not depend (solely) on municipal revenues, but rather on "certain 
objective" factors that influence costs of municipalities. Taking this into 
account, it is expected that expenditure effects of intergovernmental 
transfers should be lower than in countries where the amount of municipal 
(or other lower government tiers) spending more depends on revenues 
obtained.14 
Municipal expenditure categories considered in the analysis 
correspond to total expenditures, which means that both current and 
investment expenditures and transfers, as well as loans given and debt 
repayments are included. As already noted, municipalities in Slovenia 
receive resources from many sources, including transfers. 
Intergovernmental transfers considered in the analysis are those received 
from central government budget as well as from other public funds and 
agencies, including also possible financial equalisation. Specifically, 
intergovernmental transfers are classified into three categories: total 
transfer revenues; transfer revenues from central government budget; and 
transfers from central government budget excluding financial equalisation. 
                                              
13  In other words, municipalities with insufficient own revenues to finance municipal 
appropriate expenditures, receive additional revenues in order to be able to perform their 
duties (see Act on Local Finances ZFO-1A, 2008). Both economic and social rationale 
exist for introduction of financial equalisation, such as relatively small size of 
municipalities, limited scope for user-charging due to the potential negative social impacts 
and high collection costs, not to mention the directives of European Charter of Local Self-
Government (1985), which in Article 9 supports the institution of financial equalisation that 
ought to correct the effects of unequal distribution of potential financial sources and 
burdens of local authorities. More on the financial equalisation see also Bailey (1999). On 
aggregate, financial equalisation amounted approximately 54 million EUR in 2009, which 
is not substantial when compared to total revenues of municipalities, although 191 
municipalities received that kind of central government support (Ministry of Finance, 
2011). 
14 For the review of the literature on the local government system and description of the 
problems associated with municipal finances in Slovenia see, e.g., Setnikar-Cankar et al. 
(2000), Oplotnik & Brezovnik (2004), Vlaj (2004) and Brezovnik et al. (2006). 
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Consequently, the empirical study would also like to examine the 
variations in magnitude of expenditure effects of different categories of 
transfers. Municipal expenditure and transfer data were obtained from the 
Ministry of Finance. 
Regression analysis uses per capita municipal total expenditures as 
dependent variable. Covariates used in the analysis are aforementioned 
per capita municipal transfer revenues, per capita income15, which relates 
to idea that available income should be the other important prerequisite 
for municipal spending, consequently making the possibility to test the 
existence of fly-paper effect. All those variables are expressed in log terms. 
Besides, the analysis also includes additional control variables such as 
expenditures needs (LNEEDS), to control for the ability of municipality to 
meet the demands for local public goods provision 16 , total municipal 
population (POP), to control for potential scale effects, density – municipal 
population per squared kilometre of territory (DENS) – to control for 
potential congestion effects, proportion of population unemployed 
(UNEMP), proportion of population older than 65 years (65+) and 
proportion of population younger than 15 years (15–), all variables 
included with the purpose to control for group-specific demands, 
predominantly of those groups within population, which have relatively 
larger demand for public spending. 17  These control variables are 
integrated into the model, since the majority of them tend to be standard 
in the empirical literature on fly-paper effects (for instance, see 
Worthington & Dollery, 1999; Amusa, Mabunda & Mabugu, 2008; 
Acosta, 2010 etc.). For instance, the exposition given in Worthington & 
Dollery (1999) specifies expenditure function for governmental provided 
goods as the function of the total amount of resources that are available 
                                              
15 Average monthly gross salary per employed person in i-th municipality is used as proxy 
for describing per capita income, since those data are available also at municipal level. 
Source of data for this variable is Statistical Office the Republic of Slovenia (2011). 
16 Basically, the expenditures on administrative operation, public utilities and education are 
used as a proxy for describing the core functions of the municipalities, and they are all 
expressed in per capita terms. The expenditures for local public utilities, education and 
administrative operation are the most important expenditures of municipalities in Slovenia, 
since the provision of those services and functions is particularly in the municipal domain. 
Source of data for this variable is Ministry of Finance (2011). 
17 Source of data for variables POP, DENS, UNEMP, 65+ and 15– is Statistical Office of 
the Republic of Slovenia (2011). All data relate to 2009. The data for unemployed persons 
are based on the so-called registered unemployment principle (National Labour Office 
methodology). 
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for funding such expenditures, the function of the relative tax price of 
expenditures, and the function of institutional and other factors that affect 
expenditure outcomes. Descriptive statistics of the variables included in the 
analysis is presented in table 3. 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics, Slovenian municipalities, 2009 
Variable Mean Max Min SD 
Expenditures per capita (EUR) 1,141 3,911 161 453 
Income per capita – monthly 
(EUR) 
1,296 1,975 753 159 
Total transfers per capita (EUR) 297 2023 1 276 
Transfers from central budget per 
capita (EUR) 
186 1350 1 182 
Transfers from central budget 
excluding financial equalisation 
per capita (EUR) 
129 1155 1 151 
PA&PU&EDU expenditures per 
capita (EUR) 
737 3,023 122 345 
Population (in 1,000) 9.725 278.314 0.320 21.761 
Density 113 1019 5 124 
Unemployment (%) 11.2 29.0 4.0 5.0 
Population 65+ (%) 16.47 26.89 12.06 2.29 
Population 15– (%) 14.41 20.78 8.21 1.79 
 
Table 3 represents descriptive statistics for variables included in the 
empirical analysis: average municipal per capita expenditures amount to 
1141 EUR per year, while average intergovernmental transfers received by 
Slovenian municipality amount to 297 EUR, which means that transfers 
represent approximately one quarter of municipal revenues. Nevertheless, 
descriptive statistics indicates that municipalities in Slovenia differ 
substantially in terms of municipal spending activities, size and population 
structure, and also in economic activity. 
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Table 4: Estimates of expenditure effects18 
Estimation (1) (2) (3) 
Lincome 0.1083 (0.0755) 0.1059 (0.0844) 0.0871 (0.0856) 
Ltransfers 0.1548 (0.0217) 0.0813 (0.0200) 0.0719 (0.0182) 
Lneeds 0.5536 (0.0451) 0.6768 (0.0399) 0.6833 (0.0405) 
pop –0.0017 (0.0006) –0.0014 (0.0007) –0.0012 (0.0007) 
dens 0.0007 (0.0002) 0.0005 (0.0002) 0.0004 (0.0002) 
unemp –0.0058 (0.0020) –0.0044 (0.0025) –0.0034 (0.0024) 
65+ 0.0044 (0.0055) 0.0080 (0.0060) 0.0088 (0.0058) 
15– –0.0087 (0.0081) –0.0117 (0.0086) –0.0084 (0.0086) 
Intercept 1.8217 (0.6941) 1.4507 (0.7189) 1.5616 (0.7222) 
Observations 210 210 210 
R2adj. 0.832 0.780 0.780 
SEE 0.138 0.158 0.158 
Durbin-Watson 1.853 1.832 1.887 
F-stat. 130.76 93.46 93.60 
Reset p 0.268 0.638 0.469 
 
Table 4 represents ordinary least squares estimation for a local 
(municipal) expenditure function for 2009. Evidently, if total transfer 
revenues are taken into account (column 1), the results suggest that fly-
paper effect exists. Namely, the elasticity of municipal expenditures with 
respect to per capita income is approximately 0.108, while the coefficient 
on per capita transfers is higher, approximately 0.155, which means that 
discrepancy amounts to almost 5 eurocents. Regarding the other 
covariates, there seems to be statistically significant evidence on rather 
weak scale and congestion effects, as municipal expenditures per capita 
tend to decrease with the size of the municipality, and increase with 
population density. Increasingly, municipalities with a greater proportion 
of groups with high demand for public goods and services do not 
necessarily have higher expenditure levels, although this statement should 
be taken with caution as only the unemployment rate is 
statistically significant (but only in two instances).19 Interestingly, if transfers 
                                              
18 Dependent variable: lexpenditures. White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors in 
parentheses. 
19 In fact, one should expect that demand of elderly and young population can already be 
observed in per capita expenditure levels, as they represent criteria for municipal 
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from central budget (with or without financial equalisation) are taken as 
covariates in the regression function (columns 2 and 3), the existence of 
fly-paper effect could not be observed, as the elasticity of municipal 
expenditures with respect to per capita income is approximately 0.106 
(0.087), while the coefficient on per capita transfers is lower, 
approximately 0.081 (0.072).20 
These estimates obviously suggest that the evidence on the existence 
of fly-paper effect is inconclusive, as the selection of the type of transfer 
category influences the magnitude of the elasticity of municipal 
expenditures. Moreover, if the findings from the column 1 would be 
accepted, the estimated fly-paper effect is relatively small in magnitude, 
especially compared to some other international findings. Interestingly, the 
magnitude of income elasticity is in the range predicted from the evidence 
in the literature, yet the impact of transfers is substantially lower. 21 
Notwithstanding, it should be acknowledged that the impact of income is 
problematic if statistical significance is taken into account, suggesting that 
municipal expenditures tend to depend on other factors, rather than 
income, denoting also potential problems in the system of local 
government expenditure formation and formulation. 
4 Concluding remarks 
The purpose of the study presented in the paper is related to the 
investigation of expenditure effects of intergovernmental transfers in 
municipal financing system in Slovenia. The empirical research indicates 
                                                                                                          
appropriate expenditure calculations. Ultimately, if the χ2 test is followed and variables 
65+ and 15– would be left out of the model where appropriate, the expenditure elasticity 
with respect to income and transfers would change only slightly. Nonetheless, all three 
existing regression functions seem to be structurally stable. 
20 Interestingly, the values of coefficients on per capita transfers are very low, although the 
intergovernmental grants have not been structured. Namely, the theory predicts that 
expenditure effects should be larger for matching grants than for lump-sum grants. This 
means that specific focus only on lump-sum grants would possibly even lower the values of 
coefficients, thereby even further restraining the possibility for finding evidence on larger 
elasticity of intergovernmental transfers compared to elasticity of income. 
21 For instance, Case et al. (1993) have pointed out that income elasticity should be in the 
range between 0.05 and 0.10, while the impact of transfers should be above 0.40. Similar 
impact of transfers has also been proposed by Gramlich & Galper (1973). Interestingly, 
Acosta (2010) has suggested the income effect of around 0.50 and transfer effect of 
around 0.65. Nevertheless, Bailey (1999) has argued that one potential pitfall of 
numerous studies is that the magnitude of fly-paper effect is overestimated, as some 
authors do not explicitly differentiate matching grants and lump-sum transfers. 
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inconclusive findings on the magnitude of expenditure effects of various 
categories of intergovernmental transfers to municipalities, which presents 
the problem also for possible validation of the fly-paper effect, although 
study does not specifically structure intergovernmental grants in Slovenia. 
Namely, the empirical findings presented in study indicate that the 
estimated magnitude of expenditure effect of intergovernmental transfers 
is substantially lower compared to results presented in some other 
international empirical studies, notwithstanding the fact that this 
magnitude should be even lower for some types of grants. It should also 
be mentioned that the effect of per-capita income is technically speaking 
not statistically significant, suggesting limited dependence of municipal 
spending on per-capita income as one of the most important sources of 
tax (on some other own) revenues. 22  Given the fact that this is an 
exploratory study, the issue of expenditure and fly-paper effect should be 
empirically addressed further, in particular in post-socialist countries. 
Potential research should be focused at the examination of the 
expenditure effects of various categories of intergovernmental transfers, 
although the distinction between matching grants and lump-sum transfers 
can be difficult in practice, so this classification has been avoided in the 
paper. Nonetheless, the research has pointed out that narrowing the 
intergovernmental expenditures has negatively affected the magnitude of 
expenditure effect. This potentially indicated that the presence of the fly-
paper effect in practice is very disputable, since it is expected that 
matching grants with potentially larger expenditure effects would prevail in 
transfers from other public sector units rather than central government. 
Yet, we should still be aware that any revelation of the existence of the fly-
paper effect somehow indicates the inefficiencies in the management of 
local government expenditures. 
Primož Pevcin, Ph.D. is assistant professor for public sector economics at 
the Faculty of Administration, University of Ljubljana. His teaching and 
research work focuses primarily on the field of public and non-profit 
management and economic theory of politics. 
  
                                              
22 The problem of insufficient relations between municipal expenditures and revenues in 
Slovenia has already been addressed by Oplotnik & Brezovnik (2004). Some legal 
amendments concerning this issue have been made in last few years, although they still 
tend to be insufficient according to the evidence presented in the study. 
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POVZETEK 
IZDATKOVNI UČINKI TRANSFERNIH 
PRIHODKOV LOKALNIH OBLASTI – PRIMER 
SLOVENIJE 
Ključne besede: lokalne javne finance, transferni prihodki občin, 
izdatkovni učinki 
Namen prispevka je predstaviti empirične dokaze o "lepljivosti" 
transfernih prihodkov lokalnih oblasti v specifičnem kontekstu 
postsocialistične države. Namreč, transferni prihodki lokalnih oblasti imajo 
fiskalne (izdatkovne) učinke, saj spodbujajo zagotavljanje (proizvodnjo) 
lokalnih javnih dobrin in storitev. Natančneje, lump-sum (pavšalni) 
transferji naj bi imeli večji učinek na lokalno javno porabo kot 
enakovredno povečanje dohodkov rezidentov – gre za tako imenovan 
učinek muholovke, ki označuje "lepljivost" tako pridobljenih sredstev 
lokalnih oblasti. Ugotovitve empiričnih študij kažejo, da pavšalni transferji 
centralnih oblasti k lokalnim oblastem povzročajo večji stimulacijski 
učinek na lokalno javno porabo kot enakovredno povečanje dohodka 
sredinskega volivca. Učinek muholovke je pogosto obravnavan v literaturi, 
čeprav je večina študij usmerjenih na razvite industrijske države, medtem 
ko je ta problem relativno redko obravnavan v nerazvitih ter tudi 
postsocialističnih državah. Na primer, tako je ameriški raziskovalec Inman 
leta 2008 poročal, da je Googlov iskalnik Scholar zaznal že več kot 3500 
raziskav na to temo. Čeprav je večina študij lahko potrdila veljavnost tega 
pojava v praksi, pa so ga nekatere študije tudi ovrgle. Nekateri avtorji 
celo trdijo, da je učinek muholovke pravzaprav statističen pojav, saj lahko 
neustrezna metodologija ocenjevanja ustvari iluzijo o prisotnosti tega 
učinka. Poleg tega je v teoriji mogoče zaslediti tudi pregled drugih 
mogočih dejavnikov, ki povzročajo precenjevanje dejanske velikosti tega 
učinka, kot so napačna razvrstitev posameznih transferjev, uporaba 
neustrezne funkcijske oblike regresijskega modela ter uporaba 
neprimernih pojasnjevalnih spremenljivk v ekonometrični analizi. 
Glede na navedeno je glavni namen študije preučitev velikosti 
izdatkovnih učinkov transfernih prihodkov lokalnim oblastem ter preveritev 
morebitnega obstoja učinka muholovke v financiranju slovenskih občin v 
letu 2009. Odhodki slovenskih občin namreč zajemajo tekoče in 
investicijske odhodke in transferje, dana posojila in kapitalske naložbe ter 
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odplačila dolga, pri čemer skladno z zakonodajo občine opravljalo 
lokalne zadeve javnega pomena za zadovoljevanje potreb svojih 
prebivalcev. Natančneje, občine skrbijo za upravljanje občinskega 
premoženja in organizacijo občinske uprave, oblikovanje pogojev za 
gospodarski razvoj občine, pripravljajo prostorske načrte za razvoj in 
stanovanjsko gradnjo, upravljanje in izvajanje lokalnih javnih služb, 
zagotavljanje določenih družbenih storitev (predvsem predšolsko in 
osnovnošolsko izobraževanje, kulturne in rekreacijske dejavnosti ipd.), 
vzdrževanje lokalnih javnih cest itd. Po drugi strani občine v Sloveniji za 
izvajanje svojih nalog pridobivajo sredstva iz davčnih prihodkov, 
nedavčnih prihodkov, kapitalskih prihodkov, donacij, transferjev in 
sredstev EU. Omeniti velja, da zakonodaja določa tudi tako imenovano 
primerno porabo občin, ki se nanaša na možnost opravljanja ustavnih in 
zakonskih obveznosti posamezne občine. V povezavi s tem so finančno 
prikrajšane občine, ki si ne morejo zagotoviti lastnih sredstev za izvajanje 
zakonsko določenih nalog, upravičene do dodatne finančne pomoči 
države v skladu z načeli in merili, ki jih predpisuje zakon (tako imenovana 
finančna izravnava). To dejansko pomeni, da lokalna (občinska) javna 
poraba ni odvisna samo od zbranih občinskih prihodkov, temveč temelji 
na "določenih objektivnih" dejavnikih, ki vplivajo na stroške delovanja 
posamezne občine. Ob upoštevanju tega je namreč smiselno pričakovati, 
da bodo izdatkovni učinki transfernih prihodkov nižji kot v državah, kjer je 
lokalna javna poraba bolj odvisna od obsega zbranih prihodkov lokalnih 
oblasti. 
V bistvu so rezultati empirične ekonometrične analize pokazali, da je 
veljavnost učinka muholovke relativno težko potrditi. Namreč, ob 
upoštevanju celotnih transfernih prihodkov občin je elastičnost občinskih 
izdatkov glede na dohodek na prebivalca približno 0,108, medtem ko je 
elastičnost občinskih izdatkov glede na transferne prihodke višja in znaša 
približno 0,155, kar pomeni, da razlika (učinek muholovke) znaša skoraj 
5 centov. Vendar pa empirična analiza po drugi strani kaže, da 
upoštevanje samo transfernih prihodkov iz državnega proračuna (z 
finančno izravnavo ali breznje) povzroči, da je obstoj učinka muholovke 
težko potrditi, saj je elastičnost občinskih izdatkov glede na dohodek na 
prebivalca približno 0,106 (0,087), medtem ko je elastičnost občinskih 
izdatkov glede na transferne prihodke nižja, saj znaša približno 0,081 
(0,072). Ugotovitve so zanimive zato, ker je elastičnost izdatkov glede na 
transferne prihodke relativno nizka, čeprav smo se v študiji izognili 
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klasifikaciji transferjev na pavšalne in nepovratne. Namreč, teorija 
predvideva, da naj bi bili izdatkovni učinki večji za nepovratne transferje 
kot za pavšalne transferje, glede na to da imajo prvi poleg dohodkovnega 
tudi substitucijski učinek. Tako je pričakovati, da bi usmeritev izključno na 
pavšalne transferje verjetno celo zmanjšala velikost izdatkovnih učinkov in 
s tem še otežila mogočo statistično sprejemanje prisotnosti učinka 
muholovke. 
Rezultati empirične študije, predstavljene v prispevku, tako kažejo na 
precej omejeno možnost potrjevanja veljavnosti učinka muholovke v 
praksi financiranja slovenskih lokalnih oblasti, pri čemer je posebej 
zanimivo to, da je analiza pokazala na precej nizko elastičnost občinskih 
odhodkov glede na transferne prihodke, zlasti v primerjavi z ugotovitvami 
nekaterih drugih mednarodnih študij. Izpostaviti pa velja tudi ugotovitev, 
da je vpliv dohodka na prebivalca na obseg občinskih odhodkov 
statistično neznačilen, kar kaže na to, da je lokalna (občinska) javna 
poraba v veliki meri odvisna od drugih dejavnikov in ne od dohodka 
rezidentov, kar označuje tudi morebitno problematiko sistema lokalnih 
javnih financ v Sloveniji. 
 
